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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

'

X

ifif

In the Matter of the Application of
Petitioner,

Index No.

-againstVERIFIED

BRION D. TRAVIS, as Chairman of the
State Division of Parole, the State Division of
Parole and the State Board of Parole,

ARTICLE 78 PETITION

Oral Argument Is Requested

Respondents,

FOR A JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR

ARTICLE 78

x
'A.

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

Petitioner , by her attorneys, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind , Wharton &
Garrison, alleges, on the basis of personal knowledge or otherwise upon information

f

and belief:
1.

Petitioner, now 37, has been in jail since February 22, 1994,

currently at the

|

r

fifteen years, imposed in

(Leaman, J.) , as the result

of a plea bargain. Her crime was vehicular homicide while intoxicated , causing the
death of a

&

|. She is serving a sentence of one to
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m
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2.

In three times denying her parole

—

most recently by order

dated October 14, 1999 -- respondent parole authorities have regularly acted in total

disregard of the factors which the statutes require them to consider in passing on

applications for parole. Each time , they have ignored the recommendation of the

&

'

•

'

sentencing judge who said that early release would do justice, since “ it does no honor
and no help to this deceased child to destroy another life. ” They have disregarded

;

wpetitioner’s lack of any prior criminal history.

They have given no heed to her

perfect record while incarcerated, most particularly her faithful attendance at all

tr*

.

meetings of her Alcoholics Anonymous groups.

-

3.

Instead , the authorities have again and again spoken only of the

admittedly tragic circumstances of the crime.
4.

iII? :

m

Thus, in the language of Article 78, the decisions of the

Division of Parole have been arbitrary and capricious, and the Division has failed to
perform the duty enjoined upon it by law: namely , to make its decision in light of the

factors specified by statute.

5.

£<

•

The result has been to turn the parole procedures into a charade.

The parole authorities have considered petitioner for parole only at two-year

intervals -- as infrequently as the law permits. And they then have made the hearings

1

and decisions empty ceremonies. This is not a case of authority dealing lawfully with
,v

*

a human life; it is meaningless ritual and incantation.
6.

*

Petitioner is, in consequence, incarcerated in defiance of law,

and in violation of her entitlement, under the State and Federal constitutions, to due
yj

process of law.

2
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7.

The usual remedy for an executive agency’s failure to comply

with the law is to order the agency to do it again

-- and do it right.

But here the

agency has already had three chances to do it right, and has done it wrong each time.

II
8 §3«$
'

J*?

•

If the parole authorities got another chance and denied parole again, their ruling
would be set aside as an abuse of discretion . Accordingly , the proper remedy now is

a judgment directing respondents to release petitioner forthwith.
THE RESPONDENTS
8.

Respondent the State Division of Parole is created by Exec. L.

§ 259(i). Respondent Brion D. Travis is chairman of the Division and its chief

executive officer. Respondent the State Board of Parole is created by Exec. L. § 259b, within the State Division of Parole.

THE FACTS
9.

was brought up ii

Petitioner was bom on March 3, 1962, in

|.

She graduated from high school in

. She
id

married soon thereafter. She and her husband are the parents of a boy ,

10.

After high school and a few months of college, petitioner was at

all times regularly employed as a waitress or manager in various restaurants. In

1992, while continuing to work in a restaurant, she opened a shop in

selling

arts and crafts pieces made by local craftsmen, and some work of her own.

11.

|.

On the evening of August 25, 1993, petitioner went to a bar in

She was under serious stress: her grandfather, to whom she was very

3
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close, had just died; her long-troubled marriage had finally come to an end ; and

falling sales had forced her to close her shop. She drank a number of beers, and an

police department ,

officer of the

|, agreed to act as a designated

driver and drive her home in her car. Instead , he drove her to his home, and made a
sexual advance. When she said no, the police officer gave her the car keys and told
her to drive herself home .

It was now about 1 a.m. on August 26. She tried to drive

12.

home, but on the way she struck and killed

who was

riding his bicycle.
13.

Her blood alcohol level was .26, well over the legal limit.

14.

Petitioner was indicted on five counts, the most serious being

manslaughter in the second degree. She had never before had any involvement

whatsoever with the law.
15.

After extensive negotiations, petitioner agreed to a plea bargain:

she would plead guilty to all counts and would be sentenced to one to fifteen years.

16.
',

She came on to be sentenced in the

before Hon.

|, on April 1, 1994.

Accepting the plea bargain,

(Ex. A , p. 9):

Judge

it is by no means my intention to destroy the life of |
or in any way to reflect somehow condemnation of her
as a person. She made a dreadful mistake. It entered into the
realm of criminal behavior. There has to be a proper
consequence that flows from it, but also I state that to purport to
condemn any person by reason of an episode such as this is
beyond the authentic expense [so in transcript] of any human
being.
,

4

FUSL000042

i
jf

m

17.

thereupon imposed the agreed-upon sentence of

Judge

one to fifteen years. But he made it absolutely clear that he contemplated that her

m

time served would be very much on the short end of the range. He said (Ex. A , pp.

1

10-11):
-

blf,

—

§:
%

i®

m
m
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$
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I
P
I
PI
: F

il

I would also note so that there is no misunderstanding on
anyone’s part, that a sentence of one to fifteen years means that
is eligible for consideration for
under the law
parole after serving one year of her sentence, and I expressly
state to the Parole Board , who has the ultimate responsibility
I is
insofar as considering when or indeed whether
no
have
at
objection
all to the Executive
to be paroled that I
Branch throughfthe Parole Board fulfilling its responsibilities
based on information that will be in essence generated from this
behavior, her coming
day forward in terms of (
to terms with any alcohol addiction or difficulty that she may
have and all of die other relevant factors that go into the whole
matter of rehabilitation, and I expressly state without fear of
consequence that if the Parole Board deems
to be
worthy of parole on the earlier end of the range that I’m setting
for it here today, I have no quarrel with that and that is not to
make light of what we’re dealing with here today , but I refuse
to have this Court ever descend into the realm of pure
vengeance or punishment. We’re not in the business of doing
that but rather to have a just reflection of the behavior that
brought a person here in the first place, and I think the fact that
the outer limit of the sentence is 15 years is a reflection that a
child has died , but at the other end of the sentence the one year
is a reflection, too, that it’s a human being that is involved , and
it does no honor and no help to this deceased child to destroy
another life in the process, and I don’t think that, and I feel
who have
quite confident that the parents of young
expressed themselves most gracefully in a letter which this
Court has reviewed I don’t believe that they would have a
differing point of view. They look for some recognition, as I
is authentically sorry for what
understand it, that
has happened .

—

I have no doubt in my mind that she is authentically
sorry for what has happened . Who would not be on one level,
but beyond that I credit her statements that she was genuinely
sorry for what had happened . So justice, I think, is a proper

5
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balance of a consequence proportionate to what has brought us
here tempered with an authentic well founded compassion, and
that is what I hope has emerged from this process.

Despite the Court’s recommendation, petitioner will have been
ted more than six years by the time this petition is heard , currently at the

19.

She has come up for parole three times, in December of 1994,

1998. Each time, parole was denied and petitioner was directed to return
jr

two years. Thus, barring other development, petitioner will not come up again

: for parole until December 2000.
THE STATUTORY COMMAND

20.

-

Exec. L. § 259 c states:
The state board of parole shall:

1. have the power and duty of determining which
inmates serving an indeterminate . . . sentence of imprisonment
may be released on parole and when and under what conditions;

*
4. establish written guidelines for its use in making
parole decisions as required by law. . . .

21.

Section 259-i(2) provides:

2.

Parole.

(a) At least one month prior to the expiration of the
minimum period or periods of imprisonment fixed by the court
or board , a member or members as determined by the rules of
the board shall personally interview an inmate serving an
indeterminate sentence and determine whether he should be
paroled at the expiration of the minimum period or periods in
accordance with the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision

6
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four of section two hundred fiftv-nine-c. If parole is not granted
upon such review , the inmate shall be informed in writing
within two weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons
for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be eiven in detail
and not in conclusorv terms. The board shall specify a date not
more than twenty-four months from such determination for
reconsideration, and the procedures to be followed upon
reconsideration shall be the same [emphasis added].

(c) Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted
merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of
duties while confined but after considering if there is a
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released , he will
live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine
respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the
guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two
hundred fiftv-nine-c shall require that the following be
considered : (0 the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education , training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates: ***
(iii ) release plans including community resources , employment.
education and training and support services available to the
inmate: *** and (vl anv statement made to the board bv the
crime victim or the victim's representative, where the crime
victim is deceased ’ Notwithstanding the provisions of this
section, in making the parole release decision for persons whose I
minimum period of imprisonment was not fixed pursuant to the ( I
provisions of subdivision one of this section, in addition to the , 1
1
factors listed in this paragraph the board shall consider the
(
)
factors listed in paragraph a of subdivision one of this section
|
[emphasis added] , j

^

22.

.

Paragraph (a) of subdivision one of Section 259 reads in part :

Such guidelines shall include (i) the seriousness of the
offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of
sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the
district attorney , the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest and prior to

7
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confinement: and (ii) prior criminal record including the nature
and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or
parole supervision and institutional confinement [emphasis
added].
,

23.

Summing up, the statute requires that, in determining whether

an inmate shall be paroled, the Board must consider whether there is a reasonable
probability that, if the inmate is released , she will live at liberty without violating
law , and that her release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will nol

so deprecate the seriousness of her crime as to undermine respect for law.
But this determination must not be the product of speculati!

24.

caprice. The Board must consider:
,

(a) the inmate’s institutional record;
(b) the inmate’s release plans;

/

(c) any statement made to the board by the victim’s

representative;

6

^

(d) the seriousness of the offense with consideration of the

sentence and the recommendation of the sentencing court;
(e) the inmate’s prior criminal record.

25.

And , most particularly , the statute provides that, if parole is

denied, the Board must give its reasons “ in detail and not in conclusorv terms.”
26.

Carrying out its statutory obligation under Exec. L. § 259-c(4)1

to “ establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions, ” the Board of

1

Parole has adopted a set of guidelines based on offense severity and prior criminal

an

history of the inmate to give a “suggested time to be served , based on these two

V
8

ip.

I

;
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•

;

major factors. ” Applying these standards to petitioner’s circumstances (offense

If " .''

severity score of 7 and prior criminal history of 0) yields a range of 30-60 months.

27.

i

This statutory scheme is supplemented by Correction L. § 805,

which authorizes the issuance of a Certificate of Earned Eligibility to inmates who

satisfactorily complete the work and treatment programs to which they are assigned.
The statute creates a presumption of release in favor of those whose performance
while incarcerated has been exemplary; it states, in pertinent part:

m

$

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an inmate who is
serving a sentence with a minimum term of not more than six
years and who has been issued a certificate of earned
eligibility , shall be granted parole release at the expiration of
his minimum term or as authorized by subdivision four of
section eight hundred sixty-seven unless the board of parole
determines that there is a reasonable probability that, if such
inmate is released , he will not live and remain at liberty
without violating the law and that his release is not
compatible with the welfare of society [emphasis added].

-

28.

p

Petitioner was awarded Certificates of Earned Eligibility on

r

December 5, 1994, December 2, 1996, January 6, 1997 and December 3, 1998

f

(Ex. B).

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO PAROLE

29.

Applying these various criteria to petitioner produces the

;
|
mandatory and obvious conclusion that every criterion points in favor of her release.
k;*

Institutional Record

f&y

30.

Petitioner’s institutional record has been exemplary. She has a

perfect disciplinary record , she has been awarded Certificates of Earned Eligibility

again and again, and she has regularly received very positive evaluations in every

B
9
6*"

mm
Mm
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work assignment she has been given, and in every program in which she has

f

t

participated .

M

IP

(See

examples in Ex. C.) At the request of the prison authorities, she

has spoken on alcohol and crime to University of Buffalo students in 1995 and 1996,
to groups of juvenile offenders in 1994 and 1996, and to Marist College students of

I

criminology and to a group of representatives of MADD (Mothers Against Drunk
Driving) in 1997.
Release Plans

31.

In

Petitioner has been steadily employed throughout her adult life.

In consequence, upon her release she will surely resume being a productive, effective
member of her community .

32.

Since September 1997, petitioner has been working in the

I.

horticulture department at
in charge of two greenhouses.
mm
job upon her release by
KfSk
: ; (EX. D).
|
/

Statement

»>

^

by

Victim’ s

She is a teacher’s aid , and is

As a result of this experience, she has been offered a

|, a landscaping business in

Representative

•

33.

According to the pre-sentence report,

probation department:

-

father told the

suffered for twenty-seven hours before he died. We

TJV

would like to see her get a month [of incarceration] for every hour he suffered ” ( Ex.

R*®

1

>

"

•

p. 3). Petitioner has served far more than double this desired sentence.
34.

;'er

family nor any other representative has

No member of

made any statement to the Board of Parole.

10
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The Seriousness of the Offense,
The Sentence and the Court’s Recommendation

m

35.

we have seen, approved a plea bargain calling for a minimum sentence of one year,

ip:

and said (Ex. A , p. 11):

...

I expressly state without fear of consequence that if the

to be worthy of parole on
Parole Board deems
range
that
I
die
setting for it here today, I
’
m
of
end
earlier
the
have no quarrel with that and that is not to make light of what
we’re dealing with her today, but I refuse to have this Court
ever descend into the realm of pure vengeance or punishment.
We’re not in the business of doing that but rather to have a just
reflection of the behavior that brought a person here in the first
place, and I think the fact that the outer limit of the sentence is
15 years is a reflection that a child has died, but at the other end
of the sentence the one year is a reflection, too, that it’s a
human being that is involved , and it does no honor and no help
to this deceased child to destroy another life in the process.

ii:
'v

Of course, petitioner’s offense was serious. But the court , as

-

¥ Likelihood Petitioner Will Violate Law Again

m
p
1
r

36.

Except for this sad occurrence , petitioner has a perfect record.

She has never before had the slightest trouble with the law .

jv '

ii
'

37.

AI

lymous,

r

regularly attending the weekly meetings of her group.

38.

:

While in prison, she has been a faithful participant in Alcoholics

There is, in consequence, every reason to believe that petitioner

[1 live at liberty without violating the law .

Blfeior Criminal Record

|
"

'

.

; ("

rCr*

-

39.

Petitioner has no prior record , not even a speeding ticket.

*

*

SS&WBsP -

few

"

.

Siu’

11
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40.

Thus, each and every factor which the statutes require to be

considered in shaping the parole determination points in favor of petitioner’s parole.

THE PAROLE BOARD’S ACTIONS
41.

Petitioner first appeared before the Parole Board on December

14, 1994. The hearing (Ex. F) was innocuous. The decision of the Board reads, jn
its entirety (Ex. G):

-

j V;"
'

'

V;

:v ;

'

Parole is denied. The issuance of a Certificate of Earned
Eligibility is noted. Nonetheless, after a careful review of your
entire record and this interview, it is the determination of this
panel that if released at this time there is a reasonable
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without
violating the law and your release at this time is incompatible
with the welfare and safety of the community. This decision is
based on the extreme serious nature and circumstances of the
Instant Offense, Manslaughter 2nd degree, Vehicular
Manslaughter 2nd Degree and Criminal Negligent Homicide,
wherein while intoxicated you drove a motor vehicle, struck and
who was riding his bicycle. We note
kill<
that the record indicates that your Blood/Alcohol Content at the
time of the Instant Offense was .26. We also note that your
incarceration at the present time is considerably below your
guideline range of 30-60 months. When she comes back she’ll
be within the guidelines.
42.

4

1

Thus the Board totally failed to meet its obligations under the

statute. It based its decision solely on the seriousness of the crime. It considered

none of the other factors which the statute requires be considered , it said nothing of
the statutory presumption that petitioner should be released because of her Certificate

:

of Earned Eligibility, and it ignored the statutory mandate that it state its reasons for

denying parole “ in detail and not in conclusory terms. ”

ijgfe

43.

Petitioner was not allowed to come back before a panel of the

.

12

FUSL000042

board of parole until December 11, 1996. Of the two commissioners then hearing the

matter, one favored release and the other disagreed , and the matter was put over for a
month (Ex. H , p. 9).

44.

A different panel heard petitioner’s application on January 14 ,

1997. Again the hearing was uneventful , except for the concluding thoughts which
petitioner offered (Ex. I, p. 12):

I would like to say how very sorry I am that this
happened. This has affected not only myself but it’s affected
my community, my family , my son, the boy’s family and as I
said before, if there is anything that I can do, if I can prevent
one person from getting behind the wheel of their car while
they’re intoxicated then I’ll feel that I accomplished something
no matter how small or large it may be.
I don’t want to see this happen to anyone else. I have a
son of my own. I could very well be on the other side of the
situation.
45.

The Board denied parole in a decision which tracked the earlier

ruling and shared its deficiencies. It reads in full text (Ex. I , p. 13):

Denied 24 months, 12-98. Your parole is denied.
Notwithstanding your receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate
it is the opinion of the Board that your release is incompatible
with the interest of society.
The severity of your instant offenses, Manslaughter 2nd
Degree, Vehicular Manslaughter 2nd Degree and Criminally
Negligent Homicide in which you while driving while highly
militates against
intoxicated shuck and killed
your discretionary release.
The record indicates that you had been involved in
alcohol abuse programs prior to this incident which obviously
had no effect on your behavior. Based on the above stated
factors it is the opinion of the Board that if released there is a
reasonable probability that you would again violate the law. She
is above the guidelines due to prior Board hold.

13
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46.

The Board seems here to be saying that petitioner once

" participated in alcohol abuse programs" and later committed her crime, therefore
there is a reasonable probability that she would violate the law again were she
paroled , even though she has steadily worked in Alcoholics Anonymous while in

prison.

47.

In saying this, the Board grabbed at a makeweight

—

a very old

and inadequate makeweight. The facts are that petitioner’s mother has been an

alcoholic for many years. In 1981, petitioner attended three AA meetings with her
mother, in a program intended for children of alcoholics, and in about 1985 petitioner

attended four or five meetings of a group known as Adult Children of Alcoholics. To
brand petitioner forever hopeless because she attended these long-ago meetings is, in

plain words, not rational.

48.

Most recently , petitioner appeared before the Board on

December 15, 1998. At the hearing (Ex. J), the commissioners again paid attention
almost exclusively to the circumstances of the crime and parroted their prior rulings.
Their decision reads in full (Ex. J, pp. 9-10):
Denied, 24 months, 12/2000.
Parole is denied for the following reasons: After a
careful review of your entire record and this interview, it is the
determination of this panel that if released at this time, there is a
reasonable probability that you would not live and remain at
liberty without violating the law and your release at this time is
incompatible with the welfare and safety of the community .

This decision is based on the following factors: The
serious nature and circumstances of your instant offenses
Manslaughter 1st, Veh. Manslaughter 2nd and Crim Negligent
Homicide wherein you operated a motor vehicle while, under the

14
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influence of alcohol, struck and killed
who
was riding his bicycle. Records reflect that your blood alcohol
content was .26 % [sic]. During this interview you demonstrated
little insight as to your criminal actions.

All factors considered this panel has concluded that early
release at this time is not in the interest of society.

She will be above the guidelines, caused the death of
victim, history of alcohol abuse.

49.

The comment that, at the hearing, petitioner “demonstrated little

insight as to [her] criminal actions ” defies comprehension. Not one word said by

v;

petitioner at the hearing shows either insight or its lack
She spoke only of terrible pity (Ex. J, p. 5):

m

&

m

—

because she was not asked.

It is a tragedy , it is a terrible tragedy no one should have
to go through. The boy’s parents, I can’t imagine the pain that
they are suffering.

To say that these words "demonstrate little insight " is to torture the English language.
50.

What is clear is that again the commissioners ignored their

statutory duties. They ignored petitioner’s exemplary record, in prison and before,
except for the instant crime. They ignored the sensitive wisdom of the sentencing

judge. They paid no heed to the statutory presumption favoring release of an inmate
who has received an Earned Eligibility Certificate. And they failed totally to state
their reasons for denying parole “ in detail and not in conclusory terms. ” Instead ,

they focused exclusively on the crime, and stated their conclusion in boilerplate.

51.

The decision of the panel was affirmed by the Appellate

Division of the Board of Parole, without opinion, by ruling mailed to petitioner on
October 14, 1999 ( Ex. K).

15
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52.

Most significantly, in the ruling’s recital of “documents relied

upon, ” there is no reference to the sentencing minutes (Ex. A), which record the
views of the sentencing judge. That is, the parole authorities never so much as

looked at the judge’s recommendation , and , thus, did not consider the thoughtful

Igi

views of the judicial branch.

iiliS
111$

.

53.

This is not justice, it is empty ceremony.

54.

Finally , the most basic objection to the parole authorities’

'

treatment of petitioner is that it has been just plain irrational. If the authorities were

i

rationally concerned about petitioner being a danger to society if released (and they
have never cited any evidence whatsoever about the likelihood of repeated offenses) ,

th

-

the simple remedy would be to take away her driver’s license (which the pre sentence

-

report recommended and the judge did; see Ex. A , pp. 12 13 )

m

- the remedy is not to

throw away her life.

CONCLUSION

In the classic formulations of Article 78, § 7803, respondents have

C

K:!

failed to perform the duties as to petitioner enjoined upon them by law. They have
made their determinations in violation of lawful procedure, their determinations have

been arbitrary and capricious and they have abused their discretion.
gj. ;

IT

And they have deprived petitioner of her entitlement under the

Constitutions of this State and the United States to due process of law.

16

FUSL000042

f ' T.- r -

s
m
n
m£

Had respondents complied with their statutory and constitutional

obligations, petitioner would have long since been free.

Wherefore, petitioner asks that judgment be entered requiring
respondents to release petitioner forthwith.

Dated: January 26, 2000

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON

By:

fay Topkis// v
12q5 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019-6064
(212) 373-3000
Attorneys for Petitioners

Thomas M. Keane
Gustavo A. Pauta
Of counsel
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